Picture the world order of 1991: U.S. military might projected across every theater; NATO unchallenged; the American economy almost twice as large as any other country’s. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States acceded to the status not only of a “superpower” but a “hyper power,” summoning the supremacy of the Roman Empire. It was an age of unrivaled leadership that Washington assumed would be permanent.

Three decades later, that illusion has collapsed. America’s wars in the Middle East drained trillions without securing peace, while  alliance systems failed to thwart Russian aggression. Trade liberalization with Communist China eroded American industry and bolstered Chinese technological and military power, while middle states from India to Turkey began to demand greater sway.

The age of “liberal hegemony” is now over, and “First Among Equals,” a new book by foreign policy analyst Emma Ashford, is among the first to deal with its implications. Ms. Ashford argues that America’s waning dominance is the result of a generation of foreign policy blunders.

The ideologically distinct presidencies of Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama shared a conviction that America could remake the world — a consensus that stretched national resources beyond both capacity and interests. It was, Ms. Ashford writes, a Greek tragedy of “hubris and overreach ending in predictably disastrous outcomes.”

The path forward, proposed in “First Among Equals,” requires defining national interests more narrowly under a strategy of “realist internationalism.” Ms. Ashford argues for pulling back American forces from Europe and the Middle East, shifting security burdens to wealthy allies, and redirecting resources to the Indo-Pacific. She offers “a balanced middle road” on the map of “America-First hawks,” “progressive world-builders” and “liberal internationalists.” It’s about “avoiding war whenever possible, but not at any cost.” 

Ms. Ashford holds that  Communist China represents “the only true significant threat to American interests.” However, she dismisses concerns that it will soon eclipse U.S. in naval power as “hyperbolic, to say the least,” arguing that the Chinese maritime capacity lags far behind America’s global reach.

Thus, Ms. Ashford argues, America should seek “military sufficiency,” rather than overreacting by chasing “military primacy.” It should also pursue non-military tools of statecraft to deal with the People’s Republic, including re-engaging global trade partners to bring countries closer to America rather than imposing sanctions that propel them toward China.

That argument neglects to consider how quickly the balance of power is shifting in the Pacific, where Beijing now has the world’s largest fleet and is rapidly modernizing with new carriers, advanced submarines, and long-range hypersonic missiles designed to push U.S. forces farther from Asia’s shores.

To settle for “sufficiency” is to downplay the need for American defense capacity and undermine deterrence. Beijing will not be contained by theory or economic statecraft alone; Washington must be able to build and project credible strength in the Pacific as a check on possible Chinese aggression toward Taiwan.

“First Among Equals” nonetheless sheds light on the rapid rise of other nations in an emerging era that realist scholar John Mearsheimer has called “unbalanced multipolarity.”

Communist China’s rise will not create a new bipolar Cold War, Ms. Ashford argues, because many “capable second-tier powers” are jostling for power, including Germany, France, Japan, Iran, Turkey, and India. The book notes that in 1950, some 88 percent of global GDP was generated by America, its key allies, and the communist world; today, that figure has fallen to 57 percent, as nonaligned countries catch up economically and bolster their defense spending. 

Ms. Ashford urges policymakers to rethink alliances as “flexible partnerships” rather than “rigid and unchanging security structures that lock in participants with no regard for changing circumstances.”

This vision includes a phased transition away from the U.S. military role in Europe, with capable allies filling the void, and a drawdown of ground forces and most bases in the Middle East over the next decade. “Great powers that retrench when necessary often regain prominence over time,” she writes, “but those that fail to retrench do not typically recover.”

Ms. Ashford finished her book before President Trump’s return to the White House, but she refers to him in the introduction as “the first post-unipolar president” — a situation he seems to relish.

American foreign policy is more unsettled than it has been in decades, and Ms. Ashford appears too quick to accept the emerging world order, too complacent with the erosion of American superiority on the global stage. She insists multipolarity is inevitable, though she declines to ask whether America might still shape its contours. 

Yet, “First Among Equals” resonates with a weary public. According to Gallup, only 20 percent of Americans want the nation to play the leading role in global affairs. Voters appear ahead of the foreign-policy establishment in demanding an alternative framework to liberal internationalism.

Ms. Ashford matches this instinct by providing, without falling into isolationism, a restrained strategy: more modest in scope, less utopian in ambition, and aligned to what Americans themselves consider vital. The world of 2025 bears little resemblance to 1991, yet Ms. Ashford is betting that restraint, not supremacy, will sustain U.S. power.